Fraud in Realty Transactions by Lake, David S.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1964
Fraud in Realty Transactions
David S. Lake
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
David S. Lake, Fraud in Realty Transactions, 13 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 511 (1964)
Fraud in Realty Transactions
David S. Lake*
N REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, the law will protect the innocent,
unwary, and sometimes stupid, buyer from fraud, misrepre-
sentation and deceit. This article presents a summary of that law,
categorized according to the specific matter misrepresented (i.e.,
misrepresentations of value, income, size or quantity, and con-
dition or quality).
Value
The word value as applied to real estate, is the price which
it will bring when offered for sale by one who desires, but is not
obliged to sell, and when bought by one who is under no neces-
sity to buy it.' Value can be stated as either fact or opinion.
In McMullen v. Griggs' an opinion on the value of land, both
in its improved and unimproved state, was intentionally inflated
in order to borrow money from plaintiff loan company. The court
noted that the loan company, competent to judge the value of
the property, had full opportunity to, and did, examine the
property. Its decision was based on the fact that even though
defendant stated the value untruthfully, the plaintiff had the
opportunity and competence to determine value for itself.3
The defendant in Spencer v. King4 represented that out-of-
state land given as collateral security had a value far in excess
of its true value. He did this contemporaneously with giving his
promissory note for the exchange of plaintiff's real estate. The
court, in its charge to the jury, said that even though an expres-
sion of value is untrue, it is not ground for fraud if honestly
given. However, when the seller has superior knowledge, as he
* B.A., Youngstown University; Director of Circulation, Industrial Publish-
ing Corp., Cleveland; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 See 16 Ohio Jur. 2d Damages, section 70.
2 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. N. S. 504 (1902).
3 See Belmont Mining Co. v. Rogers, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 305, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec.
619 (1895), where the court held that representations that a gold mine was
valuable cannot be misrepresentations as they are only opinion.
4 3 Ohio N. P. 270, 5 Ohio Dec. N. P. 113 (1896).
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did here, and expresses the value of his land as a specific fact,
there may be a basis for an action for misrepresentation. 5
If the vendor represents the value of his property truthfully
and honestly, he can set any value.6 In Williams v. State of
Ohio,7 the defendant was convicted of obtaining money by false
pretenses. He had represented that the land he was selling was
worth $11,000, where in fact, at the very most its value was $330.
It was decided that if the statement of value is opinion, there
can be no foundation for misrepresentation. But, if the state-
ment is made as an existing fact when it is known to be false,
an action for misrepresentation will lie.
Where the defendant misrepresented the value of land by
stating that there was a house on it, the court said that the de-
fense of caveat emptor is unavailable to one who states fact and
not opinion. The speaker cannot escape liability on the ground
that his statements were opinion if he went further and made
specific representations purporting to be fact."
A statement by a real estate agent that a certain sum was
the best price that could be obtained was fact, not opinion.9 But
a statement that a certain sum is a "good price" is opinion and
not actionable.' 0
Income
Cases illustrative of the law concerning misrepresentation of
income arose, in the main, during the period when the Federal
Housing and Rent Act of 1947 was in effect."
Thus, in Steiner v. Roberts 12 the defendants, in an effort to
5 Shepherd v. Woodson, 328 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959); cf. Frankfort v.
Wilson, 353 S.W. 2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); where the seller stated that
the land was a "valuable property." This was held to be only opinion. See
Miller v. Protrka, 193 Ore. 585, 238 P. 2d 753 (1951) as to "trade talk."
6 Chaney v. Cahill, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 472 (Ohio App. 1931); also Wilson v.
Hicks, 40 Ohio St. 418 (1884); Boesch v. Guarantee Title and Trust Co., 18
Ohio L. Abs. 655 (Ohio App. 1935).
7 77 Ohio St. 468, 83 N. E. 802 (1908); Herrick v. State of Maine, 159 Me.
499, 196 A. 2d 101 (1963).
8 Chapman v. Orrachio, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 250 (App. 1929); Manley v. Carl, 2
Ohio Cir. Ct. 161 (1900).
9 Staley v. Harvey, 189 Tenn. 482, 226 S. W. 2d 88 (1949).
10 Ibid.
11 The term income is used also to mean rents, profits, etc. The cases later
cited usually involve only one term used in its broad form to include all of
the others.
12 72 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 131 N. E. 2d 238 (1955), case of first impression. This
same problem has arisen in many jurisdictions at a much earlier date.
(Continued on next page)
Sept., 1964
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/12
REALTY FRAUDS
sell their four suite apartment building represented that they
were receiving forty-five dollars rent per month from each suite,
but neglected to mention that the forty-five dollars per month
was ten dollars over the maximum fixed by the Rent Act.
The general rule is that if the purchaser relies on his own
knowledge (in the purchase), he cannot recover for a misrepre-
sentation by the seller.'3 But the purchaser has a right to rely
on a statement by the seller as to the income of the property be-
ing sold.14 He need not make an investigation to determine the
truth of the seller's statement. Carrying this reasoning one step
further, the court ruled that even though the sellers inform the
purchaser of the correct rental income, they have the additional
duty to alert the purchaser to the fact that the rents being
charged violate the maximum allowed by law.
15
The court quoted approvingly from Section 592 of the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts:
A statement in a business transaction which, while stating
the truth so far as it goes, the maker knows or believes to
be materially misleading because of his failure to state
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Facts concerning income are not only material but go to the
very heart of the transaction. Obviously, a buyer should be able
to rely on the seller's facts regarding income, while the seller
should have the duty to communicate complete information
rather than half-truths.
The earlier cases set down the rule that false statements by
a seller as to the income from real estate are to be treated as
(Continued from preceding page)
See Tucker v. Beazley, 57 A. 2d 191 (D. C. App. 1948); Borzillo v. Thomp-
son, 57 A. 2d 195 (D. C. App. 1948); Fuhrman v. Farkas, 99 Cal. App. 2d
564, 222 P. 2d 105 (1950); Ceferatti v. Boisvert, 137 Conn. 280, 77 A. 2d 82
(1950), where the defendant thought that the rent was not over the legal
maximum, so the court held that this was not misrepresentation; Greenberg
v. Berger, 46 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1950). Contra: the purchaser must check him-
self to determine the legal maximum.
13 Wilkinson v. Root, Wright 686 (1834).
14 Nelson v. Buck, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 279 (Ohio App. 1927); Estl. v. Fabian, 6
Ohio L. Abs. 703 (Ohio App. 1928); Henschel v. Schreiber, 72 N. E. 2d 107
(Ohio App. 1946); see 27 A. L. R. 2d 41 et seq.
15 Henschel v. Schreiber, ibid.; the seller must inform the buyer that a five
year lease at $200.00 per month is worthless as the tenant has moved out,
Corder v. Laws, 148 Colo. 310, 366 P. 2d 369 (1961)
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statements of fact, and if false may form a basis for fraud.' 6 This
is followed even though the buyer is a businessman and could
have investigated. 17 However, it has been held that a statement
as to future income is only opinion and as such is not action-
able.'
8
Size or Quantity
A statement that a piece of property is of a certain size, even
though mistaken, is a misrepresentation. s In Yaru v. Alliance
First National Bank19 the seller stated, mistakenly, that the lot
he was selling had a 50-foot frontage where in fact it was only
forty-nine feet. This was held to be not a mutual mistake, as the
seller should have known the true size before making any repre-
sentations concerning it.
20
An earlier decision held that where a buyer was shown
property with a building on it, which turned out to be partly on
a public street, there could be damages recovered for misrepre-
sentation.21
In Douglas v. Plotkin22 the seller showed the buyer a lot
which he said was 20' x 100' and pointed out a barn which was
supposedly on the property. It turned out that the lot was only
20' x 80' and that the barn was on an alley later opened by the
city. The court recited what are now the elements of an action
for misrepresentation, 23 adding, "Where a person claims the
16 Nimbs v. Potter, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 372 (App. 1927); Zill v. Kocham, 9 Ohio
L. Abs. 71 (App. 1912); see Spiess v. Brandt, 230 Minn. 246, 41 N. W. 2d 561
(1950) where the seller falsely represented that he was making "good
money"; Kotz v. Rush, 218 Ark. 692, 238 S. W. 2d 634 (1951).
A statement that farmlands had produced from 350-450 tons of hay per sea-
son is fact and not opinion, Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 251 P. 2d 542
(1952).
17 Johnson v. Tilden, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. N. S. 161, 41 Ohio Cir. Dec. 180
(1912); Molnar v. Beriswell, 122 Ohio St. 348, 171 N. E. 593 (1930).
18 Lincoln v. Keene, 51 Wash. 2d 171, 316 P. 2d 899 (1957); Lanning v.
Sprague, 71 Idaho 138, 227 P. 2d 347 (1951).
19 47 Ohio L. Abs. 439, 72 N. E. 2d 919 (App. 1945).
20 See Benefield v. Dailey, 33 Ala. App. 376, 34 So. 2d 26 (1948).
21 Pierce v. Tiersch, 40 Ohio St. 168 (1883); Stone v. Farnell, 239 F. 2d 750
(9th Cir. 1956).
22 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. 461 (1897); see Allen v. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. 145
(1864), where a lot was untruthfully represented to have a hotel on it;
Schonrock v. Taylor, 212 S. W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
23 Recovery can be had where the representations are: material, substantial,
affecting the identity, value or character of the subject matter; false; rea-
sonably relied upon by the buyer and, an inducement to the transaction.
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benefits of a contract he has induced ... by means of misrepre-
sentations, even honestly made, there can be recovery .... "
Another problem is whether an incorrect statement of quan-
tity in a legal description constitutes a misrepresentation and
grounds for damages.
In Brumbaugh v. Chapman 4 the deed stated the boundaries
of a plot by metes and bounds and also stated an acreage. It
turned out that the actual number of acres was less than stated
in the deed. The court held that the acreage stated in the deed,
rather than being a representation or warranty, is ". . . in con-
nection with, and as a part of . . ." the description of the land
conveyed.
25
To what effect is the statement that the land contains "x"
number of acres "more or less"? The court, in Ketchem v.
Stout,26 replied that the buyer will not be entitled to damages,
particularly if the lesser quantity is equal in value to the price
paid. However, if the seller actually misrepresents, or conceals
facts, this rule doesn't hold.
Quality or Condition
One of the most illuminating pronouncements concerning
this area came in Traverse v. Long.27 In this case defendant list-
ed his house for sale with a real estate broker. Plaintiff met this
broker to negotiate a purchase. On an inspection tour of the
premises plaintiff seeing some patched spots in the driveway,
24 45 Ohio St. 368, 13 N. E. 584 (1887). The court here does note that if the
deficiency is considerable, this may be evidence of fraud or mistake. It
also thinks that the proper way to guarantee specific acreage is by war-
ranty.
25 Id. at 370 and 586; see Libby Creek Logging Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Ore.
336, 358 P. 2d 491 (1960); Heise v. Pilot Rock Lumber, 222 Ore. 78, 352 P.
2d 1072 (1960).
26 20 Ohio 453 (1851); in Fisher v. Zimmer, 286 N. Y. App. Div. 1129, 146
N. Y. S. 2d 170 (1955), the court determined that the variance in acreage
was material to both parties. See Nathanson v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d
363, 282 P. 2d 174 (1955).
cf. Brodsky v. Hall, 196 Md. 509, 77 A. 2d 156 (1950), where the court con-
sidered whether the statement "one acre more or less" was of essence to
the sale.
27 165 Ohio St. 249, 135 N. E. 2d 256 (1956); followed in McConnell v. Man-
tle, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 313, 179 N. E. 2d 179 (1961); see 55 Am. Jur. 551, sec. 79;
91 C. J. S. 908. Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp., 182 Cal. App. 2d 325,
6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1960); Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P. 2d 366 (1960);
Asburn v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d 71, 326 P. 2d 229 (1958); Blackman v.
Howes, 82 Cal. App. 2d 275, 185 P. 2d 1019 (1947).
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asked if the driveway was on firm ground. (The property abut-
ted a ravine and the driveway was built up from fill.) Though
the testimony was in conflict, it seems at least that the broker
represented, in his opinion, that the driveway footing was sound.
Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court held that
where conditions are open to inspection the principle of caveat
emptor applies to sales of real estate:
Where . . . the purchaser has the opportunity for investiga-
tion and determination without concealment and hindrance
by the vendor, the purchaser has no just cause for com-
plaint even though there are misstatements aind misrepre-
sentations by the vendor not so reprehensible in nature as
to constitute fraud (italics added) .28
While the Court seems to condone small misrepresentations
(whatever those may be), the decision must be looked at in light
of the fact that it should have been obvious to even a child that
the driveway was not on firm ground.
In not so broad language the court in Dieterle v. Bourne,29
said that a buyer who didn't inspect the property carefully, when
given the opportunity, is precluded from any recovery, even
where there are misrepresentations.
What is the situation when a defect in the property, if point-
ed out to the buyer, would squelch the sale? Goodal v. Hunt,30
ruled that the mere relation of buyer and seller does not create
a duty of disclosure.
This rule was used to good advantage in Shubert v. Neyer.3 1
The seller said nothing to the buyer about two previous land-
slides in the backyard of the residence purchased. The court,
in a lengthy opinion finally ruled that "mere silence is not a
representation." Further, that where there is no duty to speak,
"silence as to a material fact does not of itself constitute
fraud." 32
28 Id. at 252 and 259.
29-57 N. E. 2d 405 (Ohio App. 1943); Bowlds v: Smith, 114- Ohio App. 21,
180 N. E. 2d 184 (1961); Riley v. White, 231 S. W. 2d 291 (Mo. App. 1950).
cf. Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S. W. 2d 918 (Ky. App. 1956); and Finerock v.
Carney, 263 P. 2d 744 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1953), where the court held that
caveat emptor does not apply where the vendor conceals defects.
30 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 897 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1880).
31 165 N. E. 2d 226 (Ohio App. 1959).
32 Silence in representing farmlands: Manley v. Carl, supra, n. 8, where it
was said that as long as the seller doesn't say anything with respect to con-
(Continued on next page)
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The court implied, in Pumphry v. Quillen, 3 that where one
asserts a fact which implies knowledge of the truth of that fact,
it may be found that there was intent to deceive. In this case
the seller made representations concerning the construction of
the walls of a residence. It turned out that the walls of the house
were a mixture of clay and straw covered with tar on the outside
and plaster inside. The court struck down the defense that the
defendant did not know of what materials the walls were con-
structed.
Where the seller orally represented that the plumbing and
sewers were in excellent condition and had passed a local in-
spection, the court held that an action would lie. They said that
where the seller makes a positive statement of fact, which he
knows to be untrue, and upon which the buyer relies, an action
for damages will lie.
8 4
In Fiebig v. Brofford,35 the seller misrepresented the con-
struction of his house. In truth, the shingles and the flashings
were faulty. The court, citing Gleason v. Bell,36 reiterated the
rule that a positive statement of fact implies knowledge of its
truth. Where the seller makes a statement of fact, not knowing
whether it is true or false, he puts himself in the same position
as one who intentionally misstates a fact. This rule may seem
needlessly harsh upon the seller. It does have the effect of pro-
tecting a buyer (who usually has less knowledge concerning the
real estate) from the overzealous seller, who will say anything
or agree to anything, just to make a sale.
Where the seller represents that a house is constructed of
the best materials and in workman-like manner, and the buyer,
(Continued from preceding page)
ditions, he's in the clear. See also Kallgren v. Steele, 279 P. 2d 1027 (Cal.
App. 1955); but see Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1963) where the court ruled that a seller, who knows of facts not ac-
cessible to the buyer which will affect the desirability of the property, has
a duty to disclose such information.
33 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N. E. 2d 328 (1956); Sullivan v. Ulrich, 326 Mich.
218, 40 N. W. 2d 126 (1949).
34 Morris v. Miller, 104 Ohio App. 461, 149 N. E. 2d 751 (1957).
35 58 Ohio L. Abs. 494, 97 N. E. 2d 52 (1950).
36 91 Ohio St. 268, 110 N. E. 513 (1915); also 88 Ohio App. 461, 77 N. E. 2d
683 (1950).
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after moving in, finds a multitude of defects,3 7 a jury question is
presented as to which of the defects were latent.38 The buyer
waives all defects which a normal and proper inspection would
have revealed.3
9
One of the usual arguments advanced by a seller being sued
for misrepresentation is that the deed includes all prior negotia-
tions. This is the general rule as enunciated in Galvin v. Keen,4"
but the court went further to say that the rule ". . . does not
apply, however, to matters not consummated by the delivery of
the deed. The conveyance of the land was but a part perform-
ance of the undertaking." 41
When a home is purchased during construction, and the
plans provide for a concrete floor of four inches in the basement
but the floor is only one to two inches in depth, damages can be
had. This was the problem in Rapp v. Murray.4 2 The seller
claimed that the contract with all covenants was merged in the
deed. The court rejected this,43 demolished the seller's conten-
tion, and concluded ". . . that the acceptance of a deed to the land
upon which a building was in process was not, ipso facto, a bar
to an action for breach of the terms of the contract to build. 44
Where there was a covenant in the contract for the sale of
real estate that all assessments were paid, the making of the deed
37 Included among the defects were: well of insufficient depth, green lum-
ber, cracked and sagging walls, ruined paint, warped doors and windows,
no metal lath in the corners, defective furnace, leaky roof, tar paper on
garage roof instead of shingles, garage cement floor cracked and inadequate
electrical circuits.
38 Dennis v. Hoffman, 102 Ohio App. 283, 143 N. E. 2d 155 (1956); Rehr v.
West, 33 Ill. App. 160, 76 N. E. 2d 808 (1948).
39 Ibid.
40 100 Ohio App. 100, 135 N. E. 2d 769 (1954); Brint v. Doyon, 7 Ohio L.
Abs. 427 (App. 1929).
41 Id. at 104 and 772. Referring to a contract for the sale of land and con-
struction of a house upon it.
42 112 Ohio App. 344, 171 N. E. 2d 374 (1960); see Druid Homes Inc. v.
Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) where it was held that there is
no implied warranty that improvements on the property were constructed
in a good workmanlike manner; Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 ill. App. 2d 290,
188 N. E. 2d 780 (1963); Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N. E. 2d
175 (1955).
43 Morris v. Whitiker, 20 N. Y. 41 (1859); see Triplett v. Ostroski, 103 Ohio
App. 290, 145 N. E. 2d 209 (1957).
44 Rapp v. Murray, supra, n. 42 at 347, 376.
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did not act as a defense for the breach of those covenants.45 The
court said that a covenant to convey is performed by the convey-
ance, but covenants relating to other matters are not thus per-
formed or satisfied.
A question constantly raised is whether a given statement is
fact or opinion. When the seller, an experienced contractor, rep-
resented that the house to be sold was well built, the court ruled
that this was not opinion but fact.46 The general rule that opin-
ion is not actionable will be modified when the parties are not
equally matched in terms of knowledge or experience.
4 7
Other Matters
When a contract for the sale of real estate states that a lot
has sewer, gas, and water service, and that all expenses for them
have been paid, it was held to constitute a representation that
there was service to the lot itself, and not just to the street.4"
The court further held that an action for damages could be main-
tained even though the representation was not in the deed.
In Lefferson v. Burnett,49 the seller represented that the wa-
ter supply (from a well) was ample for all household and yard
needs. When the well failed, the buyer sued for damages claim-
ing misrepresentation. The court pointed out that where the
seller makes a positive statement of fact which he doesn't know
to be true he is liable for misrepresentation if it turns out to be
false.
The buyer relied upon the seller's representations that his
sewage system was a septic tank buried in the front yard. In
45 Mayer v. Sumergrade, 111 Ohio App. 237, 167 N. E. 2d 516 (1960); Rhen-
ish v. Deunk, 118 Ohio App. 63, 193 N. E. 2d 295 (1963); Welsh v. Tonti, 82
Ohio L. Abs. 45 (1958), 163 N. E. 2d 698.
46 Bolduc v. Therrien, 147 Me. 39, 83 A. 2d 126 (1951); Groening v. Opsata,
323 Mich. 73, 34 N. W. 2d 560 (1948).
47 Doran v. Milland Development Company, 159 Cal. App. 2d 322, 323 P. 2d
792 (1958); Ramel v. Chasebrook Const. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. App.
1961).
48 Fries v. Gannon, 9 Ohio App. 387 (1918).
49 69 Ohio L. Abs. 28, 123 N. E. 2d 533 (1952); see also Kerr v. Parsons, 83
Ohio App. 204, 82 N. E. 2d 303 (1948); Rowell v. Jarvis, 148 Me. 354, 93 A.
2d 485 (1952); Poley v. Bender, 87 Ariz. 35, 347 P. 2d 696 (1959) noted that
adjectives such as "good," "sufficient" and "proper" used to describe the
water supply of a ranch were only opinion and not actionable.
Statements regarding water supply are considered fact and material, Clay
v. Brand, 365 S. W. 2d 256 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1963); Zeleny v. Karnosh, 224
Ore. 419, 356 P. 2d 426 (1960).
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fact, there was only a concrete tank, (not a septic tank), sitting
on land still owned by the seller; but not in clear view to the
buyer. The court held that the buyer could recover all reason-
able damages since the defect was not discoverable by a normal
inspection.5 0
In Drew v. Christopher Construction Company, Inc.,5 1 the
court rejected the seller's contention that evidence of misrepre-
sentation should not be admitted to contradict the contract of
sale. Evidence may be admitted to show material misrepresenta-
tion with respect to the subject matter which induced the buyer
to enter into the contract (to his injury).
Suppose the seller claims that other sublots in a particular
allotment had been sold at a price higher than he was now sell-
ing? Ketchum v. Phillips5 2 was such a situation. Seller repre-
sented that she had sold other sublots for $20 per foot and that
they were worth $25 per foot. However, because she was a good
soul, she would sell this lot now for only $13 per foot. The
truth of the matter was that she had sold a large number of sub-
lots for only $12 a foot. The court held that the previous price
paid for a lot was not a matter of opinion but was an averment
of fact.
Similarly, when the seller misrepresents the cost price of
land when such price is the basis for fixing the present selling
price, an action for damages may be maintained. 53
An area which has caused the courts concern arises when
the seller misrepresents the law. A representation of law is con-
sidered to be opinion only and will not support an action.54 But,
50 Grau v. Kramer, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 445, 108 N. E. 2d 368 (1952); Mosser
Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1950); Kraft v. Lowe, 77 A.
2d 554 (D. C. App. 1950), where the seller neglected to tell that his plumb-
ing was connected to a septic tank in violation of the building code.
McWilliams v. Barnes, 172 Kan. 701, 242 P. 2d 1063 (1952).
51 140 Ohio St. 1, 41 N. E. 2d 1018 (1942); the contract read "... buildings
and their appurtenances thereto in their present condition." The dwelling
had no water supply, contrary to seller's representations.
52 4 Ohio Dec. Reprint- 81 (1878); in- Smith v. Patterson, -33 Ohio St. 70
(1877), the price bid by others on a construction job was misrepresented to
the plaintiff.
53 Bryant v. Stohn, 260 S. W. 2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), sale of oil royalty
acreage; Martin v. State, 200 Miss. 142, 26 So. 2d 169 (1946), oil syndicate
selling shares on pro-rata basis.
54 Mionie v. 341 Grand Street Corporation, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (N. Y. C. City
Ct. 1947), where the seller misrepresented the zoning laws.
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the courts have been ingenious in handling cases where the buy-
er has been misled by the seller's statement of the law. In Bobak
v. Mackey5 5 the seller represented that the building was in a
zone which allowed light manufacturing. It was not. The court
said that the classification of a given parcel of land to a use zone
was a matter of law, but misrepresentation of the zone in which
the property was situated was fact and will support an action
for damages.
Damages
No matter what specific item has been misrepresented, the
measure of damages is the same; the buyer may recover the dif-
ference between the value of the property as represented and its
value as it actually exists.5 In a case where the income of a
rooming house was substantially misrepresented to the buyer,
the court allowed recovery of the difference between the value
of the property if the income had been as represented and its
value with the true income.
Punitive damages may be awarded where the seller was
motivated by actual malice. In Waters v. Novak,57 the seller's
sole reason for selling was lack of an adequate water supply. He
represented the opposite to his buyer. The court held that if the
representations were intentionally false, and if the seller was
motivated by actual malice, the jury may consider punitive
damages.
Conclusion
In dealing with misrepresentation, one has clearly to sepa-
rate fact from opinion. The submission of a mere opinion, how-
ever wrong, does not give a cause of action. There will be border-
line cases where the distinction between fact and opinion is hard
to draw. The seller may decidedly weaken his defense when he
wrongly claims or implies that his opinion is backed up by facts.
55 107 Cal. App. 2d 55, 236 P. 2d 626 (1951); see Sorenson v. Gardner, 140
Colo. 317, 334 P. 2d 471 (1959); Pearson v. Allen, 150 Cal. App. 2d 638, 310
P. 2d 688 (1957); Chacon v. Scavo, 145 Colo. 222, 358 P. 2d 614 (1960).
56 Mohler v. Baker, 88 Ohio App. 461, 97 N. E. 2d 683 (1950); Henschel v.
Schreiber, supra note 14; Linerode v. Rasmussen, 63 Ohio St. 545, 59 N. E.
220 (1900).
57 94 Ohio App. 347, 115 N. E. 2d 420 (1953).
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On the other hand, not every misstatement of facts will be action-
able; an honest error will be a valid defense. Likewise, the buyer
may lose his right to recovery when he acted in disregard of his
own knowledge. He will, however, recover, when the seller by
his fraudulent statements has induced him to accept the offer.
Fraud refers not only to positive statements but also to the wilful
suppression of a material fact. The need to disclose facts may be
balanced by the buyer's duty to inspect, but the buyer can claim
recovery when the seller, through deliberate falsehoods or
malicious silence, has tricked him into an undesirable deal.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/12
